Detecting Malicious Code by Exploiting Dependencies of System-call
  Groups by Nikolopoulos, Stavros D. & Polenakis, Iosif
ar
X
iv
:1
41
2.
87
12
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
0 D
ec
 20
14
Detecting Malicious Code by Exploiting
Dependencies of System-call Groups
Stavros D. Nikolopoulos and Iosif Polenakis
Department of Computer Science & Engineering,
University of Ioannina, GR-45110, Greece
{stavros,ipolenak}@cs.uoi.gr
Abstract. In this paper we present an elaborated graph-based algorith-
mic technique for efficient malware detection. More precisely, we utilize
the system-call dependency graphs (or, for short ScD graphs), obtained
by capturing taint analysis traces and a set of various similarity metrics
in order to detect whether an unknown test sample is a malicious or a
benign one. For the sake of generalization, we decide to empower our
model against strong mutations by applying our detection technique on
a weighted directed graph resulting from ScD graph after grouping dis-
joint subsets of its vertices. Additionally, we have developed a similarity
metric, which we call NP-similarity, that combines qualitative, quantita-
tive, and relational characteristics that are spread among the members
of known malware families to archives a clear distinction between graph-
representations of malware and the ones of benign software. Finally, we
evaluate our detection model and compare our results against the results
achieved by a variety of techniques proving the potentials of our model.
1 Introduction
A malicious software or malware may refer to any kind of software that its
functionality is to cause harm to a user, computer, or network [21]. Thus, any
software with malicious purposes can be considered as malware. The most hard-
to-detect malware mutation is the metamorphic malware. According to the def-
initions given in [26], metamorphism is the process of transforming a piece of
code, utilizing a mutation module called metamorphic engine, responsible for
the replication of malware into copies that are structurally different. However,
these copies tend to exhibit the same behavior. Specifically, a very important
clue upon which is based our detection approach, is the fact that every new copy
has modified structure, code sequence size and syntactic properties [20], while
its behavior remains the same.
Malware Detection. The term malware detection is referred to the process
of determining whether a given program π is malicious or benign according to
an a priori knowledge [10,17,13,1]. For this purpose there have been proposed
several techniques that leverage various characteristics for distinguishing mali-
cious from benign programs. However, an efficient malware detection is based
2on an important process, called malware analysis, which collects the required
information.
More precisely, malware analysis [6] is the process of determining the purpose
and the functionality or, in general, the behavior of a given malicious code. Such
a process is a necessary prerequisite in order to develop efficient and effective
detection and also classification methods; malware analysis is divided into two
main categories, namely Static and Dynamic analysis [21].
◦ Static analysis: In static analysis the specimen (i.e., test sample) is exam-
ined without its execution, performing the analysis on its source code.
◦ Dynamic analysis: In dynamic analysis an execution of the malware has to
be performed in order to collect the required data, concerning the behavior
of a program. However this approach needs more expertise while is extremely
dangerous for the host environment. As a result, in most of times dynamic
analysis is performed in a virtual environment.
It is well known that the behavior of a program can be modeled based upon
system-call dependencies as they capture its interaction with its hosting envi-
ronment, the operating system. As easily one can understand, a representation
that captures a sequences of system-calls would be liable since any reorder or
addition of one or more system-calls could change the sequence. Thus, a more
flexible representation that would capture their in between relations, as a graph
in example, could address that problem [15].
As mentioned in [11], most malware relies on system-calls in order to deliver
their payload. Additionally, since the behavior of a malware program could be
reflected by the effect on its host operating system’s state, then its behavior
can be modeled by a directed acyclic graph, generated from system-call traces
collected during its execution [19], the so called behavior graph.
Our Contribution. In this paper we present an elaborated graph-based algo-
rithmic technique that effectively addresses the problem of malware detection.
Our approach for malware detection is based on the, so far unexploited, infor-
mation that system-calls of a program π of similar functionality can be classified
into the same group and also on a set of various similarity metrics concerning
the dependencies between these groups.
More precisely, having an instance of a ScD graph D[π], constructed by the
system-calls invoked by a program π, we decided to empower our model against
strong mutations by applying our detection technique on a weighted directed
graph D∗[π], which we call group dependency graph (or, for short GrD graph),
resulting fromD[π] after grouping disjoint subsets of its vertices. Additionally, we
propose the similarity metric NP-similarity that combines similarity metrics on
qualitative, quantitative, and relational characteristics that are spread among the
members of known malware families to achieve a distinction between a malware
and a benign program.
3Finally, we evaluate our detection model and compare our results against the
results achieved by a variety of techniques proving the potentials of our model.
Related Work. Our model design is inspired by the use of system-call depen-
dency graphs as described in [3,9,11].
In [11], Fredrikson et al. proposed an automatic technique for extracting
optimally discriminative behavioral specifications, based on graph mining and
concept analysis, that have a low false positive rate and at the same time are
general enough, when used by a behavior based malware detector, to efficiently
distinguish malicious from benign programs.
Christodorescu et al. [9] propose an algorithm that automatically constructs
specifications of malicious behavior needed by AV’s in order to detect malware.
The proposed algorithm constructs such specifications by comparing the execu-
tion behavior of a known malware against the corresponding behaviors produced
by benign programs.
Finally, Babic et al. [3] propose an approach to learn and generalize from
the observed malware behaviors based on tree automate interference where the
proposed algorithm infers k-testable tree automata from system-call data flow
dependency graphs in order to be utilized in malware detection.
Road Map. The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2
we present and analyze our proposed model for malware detection based on
group dependency graphs and describe the corresponding graph construction
procedure. In Section 3 we present a similarity metric that combines qualitative,
quantitative, and relational characteristics. In Section 4 we analyze our data set,
describe our experimental design, evaluate our proposed model’s implementation
against real malware samples, and compare our results against the ones achieved
by other models. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude our paper and discuss possible
future extensions.
2 Model Design
In this section, we leverage the so far unexploited grouping of system-calls, in-
voked by a program π, into groups of similar functionality and construct a graph
that its vertex set consists of super-nodes containing the system-calls belonging
to the same group, while its edge set contains the interconnection between the
system-calls of these groups.
2.1 The System-call Dependency Graph G
It is well known that the actions performed by a program, depicting its behavior,
rely on system-calls. Tracing the system-calls performed during the execution of
a malware program π, we can represent its behavior interpreting this informa-
tion with a graph, so called System-call Dependency Graph (or, ScD for short);
throughout the paper, we shall denote a ScD graph by D[π] and the system-calls
invoked by π by Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4The vertex set of a ScD graph D[π] is consisted by all the system-calls that
take place during the execution of a program, i.e., S1, S2, . . ., Sn, while its
edge set contains the pairs of system-calls that exchanged arguments during
the execution. Thus, an edge of ScD graph D[π] is a tuple of type (Si:k, Sj :ℓ)
indicating that the system-call Si invokes Sj and the k
th output argument of Si
is passed as the ℓth input argument of Sj .
ID System-call Name In Out
0 NtOpenSection 2 1
1 ACCESS MASK 0 1
2 POBJECT ATTRIBUTES 0 1
3 NtQueryAttributesFile 1 1
4 NtRaiseHardError 5 0
5 NTSTATUS 0 1
6 ULONG 0 1
7 PULONG PTR 0 1
8 HARDERROR RESPONSE OPTION 0 1
Trace Edge
1:1,0:1 S1 −→ S0
2:1,0:1 S2 −→ S0
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
2:1,3:1 S2 −→ S3
5:1,4:1 S5 −→ S4
6:1,4:2 S6 −→ S4
6:1,4:3 S6 −→ S4
7:1,4:4 S7 −→ S4
8:1,4:5 S8 −→ S4
(a) (b)
Table 1. (a) System-calls appeared during the execution of a program pi from a mal-
ware family Hupigon, (b) System-call dependencies [2].
Next, we illustrate a simple example that includes the system-call traces
obtained through dynamic taint analysis [3] during the execution of a sam-
ple from malware family Hupigon, downloaded from Domagoj Babic’s personal
webpage [2], and we explain how the ScD graph is constructed after the whole
process. Observing the data from the Table 1, we can see the construction of
the ScD graph D[π] that is a directed acyclic graph (dag); see, Figure 1. It is
easy to see that the vertex set of this graph is consisted from the system-calls
appeared during the execution of the sample and its edge set is consisted by
their in between data-flow dependencies; see, Tables 1(a) and 1(b).
Finally, we recall a well known fact that is the suspicious sample needs to
be executed in a contained environment (i.e., a virtual machine), where during
its execution time, taint analysis is performed in order to capture system-call
traces.
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Fig. 1. A system-call dependency graph D[pi] of a program pi.
2.2 The Group Dependency Graph D∗[pi]
The key idea of our detection model is based on the, so far unexploited, infor-
mation that system-calls of program π of similar functionality can be classified
into the same group, as we firstly presented it in [8]. For a proper system-call
grouping we utilized the grouping provided by NtTrace [18], a system-call moni-
toring tool for MS Windows, complying with Micorsoft’s documentation, where
each system-call has a detailed description indicating the group it belongs to;
we denote by C∗ the set of system-call groups for a given operating system and
by C1, C2, . . ., Cn∗ the groups of C
∗.
Thus, if a system-call dependency graph D[π] of a given program π is com-
posed by n system-calls S1, S2, . . ., Sn, then each system-call Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
belongs to exactly one group Cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n
∗.
Having the grouping C∗ and a system-call dependency graph D[π], we next
construct the key component of our model that is the Group Dependency Graph
(or, GrD for short). The GrD graph, which we denote by G∗[π], is a directed
weighted graph on n∗ nodes u1, u2, . . ., un∗ ; it is constructed as follows:
(i) we first define a bijective function f : V (G∗[π]) −→ Ci from the node set
V (G∗[π]) = {u1, u2, . . . , un∗} to the set of groups Ci = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn∗};
(ii) for every pair of nodes {ui, uj} ∈ V (G
∗[π]), we add the directed edge (ui, uj)
in E(G∗[π]) if (Sp, Sq) is an edge in E(G[π]) and, Sp ∈ Ci and Sq ∈ Cj ,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n∗;
(iii) for each directed edge (ui, uj) ∈ E(G
∗[π]), we assign the weight w if there
are w invocations from a system-call in group f(ui) = Ci to a system-call in
group f(uj) = Cj , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
∗.
Figure 2 depicts the GrD graph D∗[π] of the ScD graph D[π] of Figure 1; the
set Iset contains all the isolated nodes of D∗[π].
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Fig. 2. The group dependency graph D∗[pi] of the graph of Figure 1.
In Table 2, we present the groups of system-calls C1, C2, . . ., Cn∗ and the
number of system-calls inside each group. We point out that the number of non-
isolated nodes of graphD∗[π] equals the number of groups formed by the system-
call of graph D[π]; note that, the total number of nodes of D∗[π] is always n∗.
For example, the 9 system-calls of ScD graph belong to 7 groups (see, Table 3),
the ScD graph D[π] of Figure 1 contains 9 nodes, while its corresponding GrD
graph D∗[π] contains 7 non-isolated nodes and thus 23 isolated nodes in Iset;
see, Figure 2.
It is extremely important to point out that while the ScD graph D[π] is by
definition an acyclic directed graph, the produced GrD graph D∗[π] is not, in
general, acyclic. As easily one can see that by grouping nodes in D[π] it is very
likely to create directed circles and/or self-loops; an indicative example appears
in graph D∗[π] of Figure 2.
2.3 Family Identity Matrix
In this section we will describe the construction of an informative adjacency ma-
trix that will act as a unique identity for each malware family. Our approach is
based on the intuition that malware samples belonging to an individual malware
family tend to share common characteristics. This is a quite valuable informa-
tion, that we leveraged in order to develop a technique that will utilize these
characteristics in order to decide if an unknown sample is malware or not.
Defining the term characteristic when working on GrD graphD∗[π], we could
claim that a characteristic is an edge between two system-call groups, since in
order for an individual task to be performed, system-calls of specific functionality
need to be utilized and of course in different malware variants they can be
substituted by equivalent ones. Thus, we decided to focus on edges that exist
in most of the members’ GrD graphs D∗[π], constituting hence a qualitative
characteristic of their family.
7Group Name Size Group Name Size
ACCESS MASK 1 PHANDLE 1
Atom 5 PLARGE INTEGER 1
BOOLEAN 1 Process 49
Debug 17 PULARGE INTEGER 1
Device 31 PULONG 1
Environment 12 PUNICODE STRING 1
File 44 PVOID SIZEAFTER 1
HANDLE 1 PWSTR 1
Job 9 Registry 40
LONG 1 Security 36
LPC 47 Synchronization 38
Memory 25 Time 5
NTSTATUS 1 Transaction 49
Object 19 ULONG 1
Other 36 WOW64 19
Table 2. The 30 system-call groups.
So, easily one can understand that, if in a malware family, a specific edge,
appears in the majority of the members, then this edge exposes a greater signif-
icance, in contrast with another one that exists in the minority of the members
of this family. Hence, in order to represent the significance of an edge we take
into account the percentage of the members in a family in which this edge has
a non-zero value. To this point we ought to underline that, since the values in
the cells of adjacency matrix refer to the weight w of the corresponding edge, in
order to claim about the significance of an edge as a qualitative characteristic of
a family, we are interested only on the non-zero weights.
Thus, having collected this valuable information we proceed by filtering it
as to decide the significant edges that will indicate the characteristics of each
family. Hence, having computed the percentage of appearance of each edge we
ID System-call Group
0 NtOpenSection Memory
1 ACCESS MASK ACCESS MASK
2 POBJECT ATTRIBUTES Object
3 NtQueryAttributesFile File
4 NtRaiseHardError Process
5 NTSTATUS NTSTATUS
6 ULONG ULONG
7 PULONG PTR Process
8 HARDERROR RESPONSE OPTION Process
Table 3. The 9 system-calls of Figure 1 and their corresponding groups.
8· · ·
· · ·
Family F1
Family F2 Family F3 Family F48
F1(i, j) = 4
F1(k, ℓ) = 2
F1(p, q) = 3
M11 (k, ℓ) = 0
M12 (k, ℓ) = 0
M13 (k, ℓ) = 0
M14 (k, ℓ) = 0
M15 (k, ℓ) = 0
M16 (k, ℓ) = 0
M17 (k, ℓ) = 0
M18 (k, ℓ) = 0
M11 (i, j) = 87
M12 (i, j) = 90
M13 (i, j) = 12
M14 (i, j) = 1
M15 (i, j) = 89
M16 (i, j) = 87
M17 (i, j) = 96
M18 (i, j) = 90
M11 (p, q) = 57
M12 (p, q) = 0
M13 (p, q) = 48
M14 (p, q) = 60
M15 (p, q) = 62
M16 (p, q) = 60
M17 (p, q) = 0
M18 (p, q) = 0
Fig. 3. The structure of the ID-matrix.
can assign weights to each cell (i.e., edge) on this matrix constructing hence the
ID-matrix of the family as shown in Figure 3.
Finally, in order to assign weights we partition the values (ranging from 0
to 100) to three categories. However, before we assign the significance tags we
ought to define the value ranges. So, we first define a threshold about 95% and
the tags are arranged based on this threshold. Thus, we mark each cell with a
tag either Red, Gray, or White, with value 4, 3, or 2, respectively.
In our model, the Red tags cover cells containing values in the range [0.95−1],
the Gray tags cover cells containing values in the range (0.05− 0.95), while the
White tags cover the ones containing values in the range [0− 0.05].
3 Model Metrics
In this section, we present a similarity metric that combines qualitative, quan-
titative, and relational characteristics that are spread among the members of
known malware families to achieve a distinction between a malware and a be-
nign software.
93.1 GrD-Similarity Metrics
We next present the proposed methodology for malware detection. Specifically,
we present the computation of the similarity between a test sample T and every
malware family Fk of the set F , 1 ≤ k ≤ |F|. Before we proceed with the
presentation of the similarity metrics let us give some definitions and notations
used throughout the paper.
Definition 1. Let A, B two n× n matrices with elements A(·), B(·) ∈ R, and
let p, q ∈ Z. Then, we define
|A(i, j) ∩p→q B(i, j)| =
{
1, if A(i, j) = p and B(i, j) = q, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
0, otherwise
(1)
and
|A ∩p→q B| =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|A(i, j) ∩p→q B(i, j)|. (2)
By definition, |A ∩p→p A| is the number of the elements of matrix A with value
p; hereafter, this number is referred to as |A = p|.
Next, we provide a set of GrD graph similarity metrics along with a de-
scription of their qualitative, quantitative, and relational characteristics. The
following adjacency matrices represent the GrD graph D∗[π]
A. Family-Test Similarity
The Family-Test similarity metric focuses on the computation of the similarity
between the test sample and any malware family using the family’s ID-matrix.
We distinguish two similarity approaches, namely
◦ Family.to.Test cover, and
◦ Test.to.Family cover.
The main purpose of the Family.to.Test cover similarity metric is to compute the
rate of satisfiability on the qualitative characteristics of any family of the set F
by a test sample, while the main purpose of the Test.to.Family cover similarity
metric is to compute the rate of satisfiability, in terms of edge existence, of a
test sample’s adjacency matrix by the qualitative characteristics of any family
represented by its ID-matrix.
In order to compare the test sample’s adjacency matrix T with the ID-matrix
Fk of the kth family of the set F , we first need to make a cast on test sample’s
adjacency matrix T . Recall that, the cells of the test sample’s adjacency matrix
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have either zero or non-zero values. Thus, we cast any non-zero values existed
in test sample’s adjacency matrix T into 1s resulting the casted matrix T c.
Family.to.Test cover: The main process of this similarity metric is to cover in
some fashion some qualitative characteristics of family Fk with the edge existence
of the test sample. We achieve such a coverage by first computing the number
of cells with a Red tag or, equivalently, a value 4 in family’s ID-matrix Fk that
their corresponding cells in the test sample’s casted matrix T c have value 1, i.e.,
Fk(i, j) = 4 and T
c(i, j) = 1, and then dividing this number by the total number
of cells in family’s ID-matrix that have a Red tag, i.e., Fk(i, j) = 4.
We call the above proposed cover Four.to.One cover and denote it, in a
form of function, as Four.to.One(Fk, T
c). Thus, the formula that gives the Fam-
ily.to.Test cover similarity metric is the following:
Four.to.One(Fk, T
c) =
|Fk ∩4→1 T
c|
|Fk = 4|
(3)
where, Fk is the ID-matrix of the k
th family of a set F of families and T c is the
test sample’s casted adjacency matrix.
Test.to.Family cover: This metric computes the satisfiability of the edge exis-
tence in the test sample, represented by the topology of 1s in the casted matrix
T c, by the qualitative characteristics of a family Fk, represented by the topology
of Red tags in its ID-matrix. In a similar way, we achieve a Test.to.Family cov-
erage by first computing the number of cells in the test sample’s casted matrix
T c having value 1 that their corresponding cells in family’s ID-matrix Fk have a
Red tag or, equivalently, a value 4, i.e., T c(i, j) = 1 and Fk(i, j) = 4, , and then
dividing this number by the total number of cells in the test sample’s casted
matrix T c that having value 1, i.e., T c(i, j) = 1.
As above, we also call the proposed cover One.to.Four cover and denote it,
in a form of function, as One.to.Four(T c, Fk). Thus, the formula that gives the
Test.to.Family cover similarity metric is the following:
One.to.Four(T c, Fk) =
|T c ∩1→4 Fk|
|T c = 1|
(4)
where, again Fk is the ID-matrix of the k
th family of a set F of families and T c
is the test sample’s casted adjacency matrix.
B. Jaccard Similarity
One more similarity metric we utilize to empower our formula for malware de-
tection is the Jaccard index [22]. The reason we choose to utilize the Jaccard
similarity is the fact that it is mostly applied on binary vectors and thus it seems
to efficiently work for the comparison between two graph-objects in terms of edge
existence. More precisely, this metric measures the similarity of relational char-
acteristics, in terms of edge existence, between the test sample’s casted matrix
T c and a member’s casted matrix M c of a malware family Fk.
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We first utilize the Jaccard index to compute the maximum value produced
by the most similar member of the family to the test sample, and then we
compute the mean similarity between the test sample and all the members of a
malware family .
The computation of the Jaccard similarity metric is achieved by first com-
puting the number of cells that have value 1 in the test sample’s casted matrix
T c and their corresponding cells in the member’s casted matrix M c have also
value 1, i.e., T c(i, j) = 1 and M c(i, j) = 1, and then dividing this number by
the number of the cells that either in T c or in M c have value 1, i.e., T c(i, j) = 1
or M c(i, j) = 1. Hence the computation of Jaccard similarity can be computed
as follows:
J(T c,M c) =
|T c ∩1→1 M
c|
|T c ∩1→1 M c|+ |T c ∩1→0 M c|+ |T c ∩0→1 M c|
, (5)
where M c is the member’s casted adjacency matrix and T c is the test sample’s
casted adjacency matrix.
Let Fk be a malware family containingmk members and letM
c
1
,M c
2
, . . . ,M cmk
be the casted matrices of the members of Fk. The maximum Jaccard similarity,
produced by the most similar member of Fk to the test sample, is defined as
follows:
Jmax(T
c, Fk) = max
1≤ℓ≤mk
[J(T c,M cℓ )], (6)
while the mean Jaccard similarity, produced by the mean of all the Jaccard
similarity values between the test sample and the members of Fk, is defined by
the following formula:
Jmean(T
c, Fk) =
mk∑
ℓ=1
J(T c,M cℓ )
mk
, (7)
where Fk is the k
th malware family of a set F and T c is the test sample’s casted
adjacency matrix.
C. Bray-Curtis Similarity
The last similarity metric we utilize to empower our formula for malware detec-
tion is the Bray-Curtis dissimilarity [7]. The reason we select the Bray-Curtis
dissimilarity is the fact that it is mostly applied for the computation of diversity
between two object represented by vectors of continuous values. More precisely,
this metric measures the similarity of quantitative characteristic, in terms of
edge weights, between the test samples’ adjacency matrix T and a member’s
adjacency matrix M . However, since the return value of the Bray-Curtis met-
ric refers to the distance between any two objects, it is in the range [0, 1] with
maximum value the 0. Thus, in order to reverse this property we perform a
subtraction from 1.
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As with the Jaccard similarity, we also utilize the Bray-Curtis similarity to
compute first the maximum value produced by the most similar member of the
family to the test sample, and then we compute the mean similarity between the
test sample and all the members of a malware family.
The computation of Bray-Curtis similarity is achieved by computing the
sum of subtractions of the corresponding values of cells T (i, j) and M(i, j) and
dividing this number by the sum of their additions. Hence, the Bray-Curtis
similarity is given by the following formula:
BC(T,M) = 1−
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(T (i, j)−M(i, j))
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(T (i, j) +M(i, j))
, (8)
where T is the n×n adjacency matrix of test sample andM is the n×n adjacency
matrix of the member of family Fk under consideration.
Next, we first define the maximum Bray-Curtis similarity, produced by the
most similar member of Fk to the test sample, as follows:
BCmax(T, Fk) = max
1≤ℓ≤mk
[BC(T,Mℓ)], (9)
and then we define the mean Bray-Curtis similarity, produced by the mean of
all the Bray-Curtis similarity values between the test sample and the members
of Fk, as follows:
BCmean(T, Fk) =
mk∑
ℓ=1
BC(T,Mℓ)
mk
, (10)
where Fk is the k
th malware family of the set F , mk is the number of members
of the family Fk, Mℓ is the ℓ
th member’s adjacency matrix and T is the test
sample’s adjacency matrix.
D. Tanimoto Similarity
Finally we use the Tanimoto similarity [22] for filtering purposes in our proposed
malware detection model. The Tanimoto similarity is a mechanism for computing
the Jaccard coefficient when the set under comparison are represented as bit
vectors.
As with the previously described similarity metrics, we also utilize the Tan-
imoto similarity to compute the maximum value produced by the most similar
member of the family to the test sample.
The computation of Tanimoto similarity is achieved by computing the sum of
subtractions of the corresponding values of cells T (i, j) and M(i, j) and dividing
this number by the sum of their additions. Hence, the Tanimoto similarity is
given by the following formula:
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TN(A,B) =
n∑
i=1
(T (i, j)×M(i, j))
n∑
i=1
(T (i, j))2 +
n∑
i=1
(T (i, j))2 −
n∑
i=1
(T (i, j)×M(i, j))
, (11)
where T is the n×n adjacency matrix of test sample andM is the n×n adjacency
matrix of the member of family Fk under consideration.
Next, we define the max Tanimoto similarity, produced by the most similar
member of Fk to the test sample, as follows:
TNmax(T, Fk) = max
1≤ℓ≤mk
[TN(T,Mℓ)], (12)
where Fk is the k
th malware family of the set F , mk is the number of members
of the family Fk, Mℓ is the ℓ
th member’s adjacency matrix and T is the test
sample’s adjacency matrix.
3.2 NP-similarity Metric
Having presented several variants of Family-Test, Jaccard, and Bray-Curtis sim-
ilarity metrics, let us now describe the NP-similarity metric which we have de-
veloped in order to detect whether an unknown test sample is a malicious or
a benign one. More precisely, this metric globally measures the similarity be-
tween a test sample and a malware family combining, in a specific manner, the
aforementioned similarity metrics taking into account the qualitative, the quan-
titative, and the relational characteristics of the objects under consideration.
The NP-similarity incorporates a combination of the similarity metrics ref-
erenced previously, where their contribution to its final result is affected by as-
signing different weights to each one of these similarity metrics. For our purpose,
we choose four factors a, b, c1, and c2, and define three similarity-components
namely F1, F2, and F3.
The first similarity-components F1 of our NP-similarity metric concerns the
qualitative characteristics. Thus, we utilize the Four.to.One cover similarity
along with the One.to.Four similarity assigning greater weight factors in the
Four.to.One. Indeed, we choose the factor a = 4 for the Four.to.One similarity
and the factor b = 2 for the One.to.Four, while we choose greater weight factor
for the case where both Four.to.One() and One.to.Four() take the maximum
value 1; we express our choice by the following function:
φ = a · Four.to.One(Fk, T
c) + b ·One.to.Four(T c, Fk)
Our choice is based on the intuition that, if the test sample is malicious, then
it should be an expansion of a malware family inheriting and hence satisfy-
ing its qualitative characteristics. Moreover, the reason that we multiply the
Four.to.One() similarity by a greater factor is the fact that when this similarity
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metric is maximized it is indicating that the sample is a direct extension of the
malware family.
Additionally, in the case where Four.to.One() = 1 and One.to.Four() = 1,
the topology of 4s in Family ID-Matrix is identical to the topology of 1s in
test samples casted matrix and thus we multiply the function φ by the factor
c1 = 1.5, otherwise we multiply it by the factor c2 = 1.2. Hence, we define the
first similarity-components F1 of our NP-similarity metric as follows:
F1 =
{
c1 · (a+ b), if Four.to.One(Fk, T
c) = One.to.Four(T c, Fk) = 1
c2 · φ, otherwise
(13)
where, a = 4, b = 2, c1 = 1.5 and c2 = 1.2, while Fk is the k
th malware family
of a set F and T c is the test sample’s casted adjacency matrix.
The second similarity-components F2 of our NP-similarity metric measures
the similarity of relational characteristics between the test sample and a malware
family as described by the Jaccard index. We assign appropriate weights on the
max and mean Jaccard similarities, i.e., Jmax() and Jmean(), by using the factors
a and b, as follows:
F2 = a · Jmax(T
c, Fk) + b · Jmean(T
c, Fk) (14)
where, a = 4 and b = 2.
We next proceed by defining the third similarity-components F3 that mea-
sures the similarity of qualitative characteristics assigning, as before, appropriate
weights on the max and mean Bray-Curtis similarities as follows:
F3 = a ·BCmax(T, Fk) + b · BCmean(T, Fk) (15)
where, a = 4 and b = 2.
We point out that in similarity-components F2 and F3 we assign a greater
weight to the max Jaccard and max Bray-Curtis since, as we describe above,
it is more likely for the test sample to be a direct mutation of a member of a
malware family in the case where it is a malware.
We finally define our NP-similarity metric by combining the three similarity-
components F1, F2, and F3, as follows:
NP (Fk, T ) =
F1 · F2 · F3
Q
, (16)
where, Q is a normalization factor equals the maximum value of the product
F1 · F2 · F3 so that NP () ∈ [0, 1].
Intuition. The whole process of the NP-similarity construction, by the aspect
of weights assignment, is based on the intuition that during the polymorphism
procedure, it is more probable for a new strain to be a direct mutation from a
member of a malware family. Hence, so for first component, in the case of the
Four.to.One similarity, as for the other two, in the cases of max Jaccard and
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max Bray-Curtis similarities respectively, we assign a greater weight on to them
as to emphasize that probability.
3.3 Malware Detection using NP Similarity
Next, we show how can utilize the NP-similarity for malware detection based on
GrD graphs; recall that, for a malware program π the GrD graph is denoted by
D∗[π]. The methodology we follow is simple: given a test sample T , we compute
the NP-similarity metric between T and all the malware families F1, F2, . . . , Fn of
a set F , and then we accordingly compute the max Tanimoto similarity exhibited
by a member of each family. Finally, for the families with the maximum Tanimoto
similarity, we check the one with the corresponding maximum NP-similarity and
if this maximum value, indicating the most similar family Fk to T according to
NP-similarity, is above the specified threshold λ, i.e., NP (Fk, T ) ≥ λ, we claim
that the test sample belongs to F and thus it is a malware.
It is worth noting to mention that, as we will discuss later, it is experientially
proven that the application of the NP-similarity archives a satisfying distinction
between the GrD graphsD∗[π] representing malware and those ones representing
benign software.
4 Evaluation
In this section we first present our experimental design and discuss the reasons
that we adopt the proposed evaluation setup. Then, we discuss how we divide our
data set into train-set and test-set and how we tune our threshold parameters
according to feedback produced by a series experiments. Finally, we present our
detection results after the application of NP-similarity and compare our results
with those of other models.
4.1 Experimental Design
In order to evaluate our proposed malware detection technique we use a dataset
of 2631 malware samples from a set F of 48 malware families F1, F2, . . ., F48,
each Fk containing from 3 to 317 malware members, and also a set of 33 benign
samples.
Additionally, it is of major importance to mention that we do not perform
any taint malware analysis on the samples due to the risk posed to the sys-
tems connected to the same network. Thus, we downloaded the initial System-
call Dependency Graphs produced by taint analysis from the web-page of Do-
magoj Babic [2] and transformed each sample’s ScD graph D[π] into GrD graph
D∗[π], based on the grouping of system-calls presented in Table 2. The set F
of the 48 malware families along with their sizes (i.e., number of members) are
listed in Table 4.
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Family Name Size Family Name Size
ABU,Banload 16 Hupigon,AWQ 219
Agent,Agent 42 IRCBot,Sdbot 66
Agent,Small 15 LdPinch,LdPinch 16
Allaple,RAHack 201 Lmir,LegMir 23
Ardamax,Ardamax 25 Mydoom,Mydoom 15
Bactera,VB 28 Nilage,Lineage 24
Banbra,Banker 52 OnLineGames,Delf 11
Bancos,Banker 46 OnLineGames,LegMir 76
Banker,Banker 317 OnLineGames,Mmorpg 19
Banker,Delf 20 OnLineGames,OnLineGames 23
Banload,Banker 138 Parite,Pate 71
BDH,Small 5 Plemood,Pupil 32
BGM,Delf 17 PolyCrypt,Swizzor 43
Bifrose,CEP 35 Prorat,AVW 40
Bobax,Bobic 15 Rbot,Sdbot 302
DKI,PoisonIvy 15 SdBot,SdBot 75
DNSChanger,DNSChanger 22 Small,Downloader 29
Downloader,Agent 13 Stration,Warezov 19
Downloader,Delf 22 Swizzor,Obfuscated 27
Downloader,VB 17 Viking,HLLP 32
Gaobot,Agobot 20 Virut,Virut 115
Gobot,Gbot 58 VS,INService 17
Horst,CMQ 48 Zhelatin,ASH 53
Hupigon,ARR 33 Zlob,Puper 64
Table 4. The set F of the 48 malware families F1, F2, . . . , F48, along with their sizes,
i.e., number of members, downloaded from [2].
For evaluation purposes of our model, we perform 5-fold cross validation uti-
lizing the dataset we described above. Additionally, we set the detection thresh-
old λ = 0.56 (see, Section 3.3), after performing a number of experiments focus-
ing on maximizing the ratio of true-positives by the false-positives.
4.2 Detection Results
Next, we present our results after performing a set of 5-fold cross validation
experiments partitioning the data set described above into 5 buckets using in
each experiment one bucket as test-set and the other four as train-set. In Table 5
we cite our results concerning the detection rates and the corresponding false
positives for various values of threshold λ as we described it previously. To this
point we ought to notice that due to the 5-fold cross validation process the
percentage values below are averaged over the five buckets.
In Figure 4 we provide an observation of the detection rates (True Positives)
and False Positives of our proposed model, while changing the value of threshold
λ. As mentioned previously, due to the k-fold cross validation process all the
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Threshold λ Detection Rate False Positives
λ = 0.35 98.14 % 68.57 %
λ = 0.42 96.70 % 56.00 %
λ = 0.51 94.06 % 29.00 %
λ = 0.56 91.32 % 13.70 %
λ = 0.61 85.28 % 6.85 %
λ = 0.67 74.42 % 4.00 %
λ = 0.74 63.03 % 2.28 %
λ = 0.81 39.64 % 0.00 %
Table 5. Malware detection results.
percentage values shown in the figures are averaged over the k-folds, (i.e., 5 folds
for our proposed model).
In Table 6, we illustrate a comparison of our detection rates (i.e., true-
positives) and the fail detections (i.e., false-positives) against those presented
in other research works. We compare our results to graph-based and other tech-
niques both using different data-sets. More precisely, the first column refers to
the result’s host, the second one refers to the utilized technique, while the third
and fourth columns refer to the detection and false-positive rates, respectively.
Alazab et al. [1] developed a fully automated system that disassembles and
extracts API-call features from executables and then, using n-gram statistical
analysis, is able to distinguish malicious from benign executables. The mean
detection rate exhibited was 89.74% with 9.72% false-positives when used a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier by applying n-grams.
Ye et al. [25] described an integrated system for malware detection based
on API-sequences. This is also a different model from ours since the detection
process is based on matching the API-sequences on OOA rules (i.e., Objective-
Oriented Association) in order to decide the maliciousness or not of a test pro-
gram.
In: Technique True Positives False Positives
[1] SVM classifier (API-sequences) 89.74 % 09.74 %
[25] OOA rules (API-sequences) 97.19 % 00.12 %
[10] Templates (CFG) 97.50 % 00.00 %
[15] Sequence Matching (ScD) 64.00 % 00.00 %
[16] Graph-Grading(ScD) 80.09 % 11.00 %
[11] Graph Mining (ScD) 92.40 % 6.1 %
[3] Tree Automata Inference (ScD) 80.00 % 05.00 %
this paper NP-Similarity (GrD) 91.32 % 13.70 %
Table 6. Malware detection results comparison. Note that this paper uses the same
dataset as [3] and [11].
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Fig. 4. Detection results for multiple values of λ depicting true and false positives
variations.
An important work of Christodorescu et al., presented in [10], proposes a
malware detection algorithm, called AMD, based on instruction semantics. More
precisely, templates of control flow graphs are built in order to demand their
satisfiability when a program is malicious. Although their detection model ex-
hibits better results than the ones produced by our model, since it exhibits 0
false-positives, it is a model based on static analysis and hence it would not be
fair to compare two methods that operate on different objects.
Kolbitch et al. [15] proposed an effective and efficient approach for malware
detection, based on behavioral graph matching by detecting string matches in
system-call sequences, that is able to substitute the traditional anti-virus system
at the end hosts. The main drawback of this approach is the fact that although
no false-positives where exhibited, their detection rates are too low compared
with other approaches.
Luh and Tavolato [16] present one more detection algorithm based on behav-
ioral graphs that distinguishes malicious from benign programs by grading the
sample based on reports generated from monitoring tools. While the produced
false-positives are very close to ours, the corresponding detection ratio is even
lower.
Fredrikson et al. [11] proposed an automatic technique for extracting opti-
mally discriminative specifications based on graph mining and concept analysis
that, when used by a behavior based malware detector, it can efficiently dis-
tinguish malicious from benign programs. The proposed technique can yield an
86.5% detection rate with 0 false-positives. Since we compare only the max-
imum detection rates exhibitied by each technique, in Table 6 we show the
maximum detection rate 99.4% which however exhibits higher false-positives
(57.14%). However, a more fair comparison would be the one depicted in Fig-
ures 4 and ?? where for specific values of t and λ (i.e. t = 0.96 and λ = 0.56)
someone can observe that our model reaches the detection rates of the proposed
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model presented in [11] with barely 0.03% more false positives, proving the po-
tentials of our model in a further improvement.
Finally, Babic et al. [3] achieved the malware detection by k-testable tree
automata inference from system-call data flow dependence graphs. To this point
we ought to underline that in this work the authors use the same data-set that
we borrow from Domagoj Babic’s web-page [2]. Thus, this work provides a fair
instance to compare our model’s results. However, while Babic et al. perform 2-
fold cross validation using the first half of data-set as train-set and the second one
as test-set, we perform 5-fold cross validation. Comparing the results exhibited
in [3] with ours, easily we can claim that our proposed model is quite competitive
to Babic’s especially for specific values of λ (0.61 and 0.67 respectively).
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an elaborated graph-based algorithmic technique for effi-
cient malware detection by exploiting main properties of system-call depen-
dency graphs. We leveraged the partitioning of system-calls in order to con-
struct the GrD graph D∗[π] that depicts the interconnection of specific groups
of system-calls. Then, we developed the NP-similarity metric that, operating on
GrD graphs, combines a set of similarity metrics in order to distinguish whether
an unknown test sample is malicious or not based on a predefined threshold.
We evaluated our model’s detection ability and compared its potentials against
other results from several models either graph-based or not. The evaluation was
performed on a set of 2630 malware samples from 48 malware families and 33
benign commodity programs. The detection process exhibited a 91.3% rate with
13.7% false positives making it competing against other detection models.
Finally, an interesting perspective is the extension of our model for malware
indexing, i.e., to classify a test sample in a malware family, if it has been detected
as malware; we leave such an extension as a problem for further research.
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